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Abstract
Does opportunity make the thief or are people dispositionally prone to deceive? The interaction between personality and
the circumstances surrounding deception is crucial to understand what promotes dishonesty in our society. Due to its
inherent spontaneity and sociality, deceptive behaviour may be hardly reproducible in experimental settings. We developed
a novel paradigm in the form of an interactive game where participants can choose whether to lie to another person in
situations of loss vs. gain, and of no-reputation-risk vs. reputation-risk linked to the disclosure of their deceptive behaviour
to others. Thus, our ecological paradigm allowed subjects to spontaneously decide when to lie and face the challenge of
deceiving others. In the case of loss, participants lied to reverse the outcome in their favour. Deception was lower in the
reputation-risk condition where personality traits concerning social interactions also played an important role. The results
suggest that deception is definitely promoted by unfavourable events, and that maintaining one’s own reputation
encourages honesty, particularly in socially inclined individuals.
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Introduction
As we think about political lies, tax evasion or swindlers, we
realize that social interactions are very often permeated by
deceptive behaviours. Although this behaviour is publicly
condemned [1] people keep telling lies. The issue of the spread
of dishonesty among societies has been addressed from several
disciplines like psychology [2,3,4] and social psychology [5,6,7].
Importantly, the evolutionary game theory described the role of
defection and cooperation in solving social dilemmas [8,9,10]. Yet,
little is known about the circumstances under which this behaviour
is promoted and how personality dispositions influence situational
deception. Studies suggest that deciding whether to deceive
involves a motivational conflict between the temptation to
dishonestly achieve some benefit and the desire to act in a social
appropriate manner [7]. Experimental research on deception has
to face with the challenge of devising tasks that can induce such a
conflict in a naturalistic way. The majority of the paradigms used
thus far in the neuroscientific study of deception instruct subjects
when to lie and do not provide a partner to lie to. Thus, these
paradigms largely neglect two fundamental aspects of deception
namely intentionality and sociality (for a review see [11]). More
ecological paradigms in which subjects could spontaneously
deceive [12,13] other people [14] have been used only recently.
Here we devised a novel experimental paradigm able to induce the
conflict that people experience when faced with the choice to
deceive or not another person and tested the effect on deceptive
behaviour of both situational and dispositional variables. It is well
known, for example, that deciding to be dishonest depends on the
circumstances as the same person can decide to cheat during an
academic exam but never evade taxes, or he/she could lie about
his/her curriculum but never lie to his/her friends. Moreover, the
circumstances where the people’s goals could not be accomplished
non-deceptively, promote lying behaviour [2].
It has also been demonstrated that people deceive less when the
potential monetary reward related to cheating is significantly high
thus making the circumstance morally challenging; or when cues
to their moral standards are provided [6]. In contrast, people
deceive more when the monetary reward for cheating is replaced
by tokens and the moral implications of the circumstance can be
reinterpreted [6].
Among the situations that may change the tendency to lie,
reputation management plays an important role. People care so
much about how they are regarded by others that acquiring a
good reputation activates reward-related brain areas [15].
Moreover, building and maintaining one’s own reputation plays
an important role in promoting cooperation and prosocial
behaviour [16,17]. In a similar vein, the presence of potentially
disapproving people or authority figures (i.e. of external cues to
self-regulation) elicits a reduction in the expression of racial bias
[18,19,20]. Importantly, under realistic deception situations
people risk to loose their social capital [21]. Thus, the decision
to deceive has to take into account the ability to manage one’s own
reputation. Despite the importance of this variable, no study has
investigated the role of reputation management on deception thus
far.
Another important determinant of deception is the dispositional
tendency to behave according to one’s own individual differences
in personality traits. Studies indicate, for example, that people who
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in impression management, manipulativeness and extroversion
scales [3]. Likewise, manipulative people when asked about their
lie-telling behaviour in everyday life, seem not to perceive
themselves as frequent liars, and report to feel less guilty about
their lies and comfortable when imagining to lie in high-stakes
situations [22].
No systematic evidence for the comparative influence of
situational and dispositional variables on deceptive behaviour
has been provided. In the present study, we investigate how the
decision to deceive another individual is influenced by two
important situational variables (namely favourable vs. unfavour-
able reality and the reputation risk vs. no reputation risk) and by
dispositional individual differences (personality traits). We created
an experimental situation in which subjects were free to decide
whether to tell the truth or to lie to an opponent player in order to
obtain an economical benefit (self-gain lies) or to help another
individual (altruistic lies). Moreover, we measured the impact of
reputation on this decision. The participants’ concern about their
reputation was induced by telling them that the other player would
be aware of their decision. Moreover, we tested whether the
perceived reputation risk and the deceptive behaviour was
enhanced in subjects who played with the opponent seated in
the same room (Presence-Group) with respect to those who played
with the opponent seated in a different room (No-Presence
Group). Specifically, we asked whether facing the event of a loss
would promote deception among participants (as measured by the
number of self-gain lies) and whether the impact of reputation
would decrease self-gain lies and increase altruistic lies.
To investigate the interactions between personality and
deceptive behaviour, we examined extensively the participants’
personality (by means of the short form of Temperamental and
Character Inventory, [23]). Moreover, we examined manipula-
tiveness, moral disengagement, impression management and self-
deception as individual differences dimensions that we expected to
be important predictors of deception in social interactions.
Methods
Participants and Design
Fifty-two participants (26 females, age between 19 and 29 years,
mean=24.38) were recruited. Two participants were excluded
from the analysis because they did not believe they were playing
against a real person. Twenty-six of them (13 females) played in
the No-Presence Group and twenty-four (12 females) played in the
Presence Group. Subjects were paid 10 euros for their participation
and had the possibility to extra win up to 30 euros during the
game. All the subjects signed written informed consent prior to be
enrolled. The experimental protocol was approved by the
independent Ethics Committee of the Santa Lucia Foundation
(Scientific Institute for Research Hospitalization and Health Care)
and was carried out in accordance with the principles of the 1964
Declaration of Helsinki.
Experimental Task
Subjects (Ss) performed in a two-cards game where an ace of
heart was associated with gain, and an ace of spades was associated
with loss. Each subject was instructed that the opponent player
(OP) was the first mover and was supposed to choose one of the
two covered decks without knowing the outcome of the choice,
which would be communicated by the S. By lying, S had the
chance to reverse the outcome and thus to win when he/she had
actually lost (self-gain lie) or to lose when he/she had actually won
(altruistic lie). Trials in which the S was supposed to gain or to lose
were defined as Favourable and Unfavourable Reality respec-
tively. S performed the game in two conditions: the Reputation-
Risk (R), in which S knew that OP was informed about his/her
lies; and the No-Reputation Risk (NR) in which S knew that the
OP was not informed. The order of the two conditions was
counterbalanced across participants. The two players had 25 euros
each for playing. For each trial, the winner took money from the
other player’s payoff. S were told that the amount of gain/loss on
each trial was arbitrarily decided by a computer algorithm. The
precise amount of gain/loss was communicated only at the end of
the task. This allowed to rule out that the subjects’ behaviour was
based on a trial by trial computation of gain/loss.
Materials and Procedure
Subjects were seated comfortably in an acoustically shielded
room. Stimulus presentation timing and randomization were
controlled by using E-prime ver.1.2 software (Psychology Software
Tools Inc., Pittsburgh, PA) running on a PC. Participants sat
57 cm away from a 22 inch LCD monitor where the stimuli, two
play cards consisting in an ace of heart and an ace of spades,
appeared on a white background (see figure 1). Each trial started
with the presentation of a central fixation cross lasting 1000 msec,
followed by the presentation of the stimuli. The left/right position
of the heart/spades ace was counterbalanced. After a varying time
interval (between 2000 and 3000 msec), one of the two cards
became bigger, indicating the OP’s choice. This randomized
interval was employed for the No-Presence Group to provide
tangible probes that the OP was a real person. For the Presence-
Group, the actor triggered the stimulus presentation by clicking a
mouse. After each OP’s choice, participants were asked to press on
a keypad either the ‘‘V’’ key to communicate the truth (the italian
word for truth is verita `) or the ‘‘M’’ key to lie (the italian word for
lie is menzogna). The stimulus remained visible on the screen until
the response was given. Each block contained 80 trials, half of
them providing the Unfavourable Reality (the OP won), the other
half the Favourable Reality (the OP lost).
To avoid any spurious influence, in no condition was the
experimenter in the testing room.
No-Presence of the OP (Group 1)
Subjects were told that they were going to play an online card
game with another participant situated in a different room of the
building and that they would meet the other player at the end of
the game.
Physical Presence of the OP (Group 2)
After reading the task instructions, subjects were blindfolded
while the other participant (the actor) entered the room. Once
subjects were seated, they could see only the computer screen in
front of them and had no chance to look at the other player. This
procedure assured us that the actor’s physical features would not
influence the subjects’ performance. In addition, we informed Ss
that they were not allowed to talk and that thanks to a microphone
in the room the examiner could stop the experiment in the event
that someone spoke. That S did not actually talk was double
checked by asking the actors in the room. Importantly,
unbeknownst to the subjects, the OP choice was controlled by a
computer.
Manipulation Check
After the game, participants were qualitatively debriefed about
the interaction. We asked them questions like: ‘‘Did you enjoy the
game?’’; ‘‘Has your opponent been lucky?’’; ‘‘Was he/she luckier
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declared they did not believe or were sceptical about the fact that
the OP was a real player were excluded from the analysis.
Personality Measures
After the manipulation check, subjects performed the electronic
version of the short form of Temperamental and Character
Inventory designed to assess four temperamental (Novelty Seeking;
Harm Avoidance; Reward Dependence; Persistence) and three character
(Self-Directedness; Cooperativeness; Self-Transcendence) dimensions [23].
Moreover, subjects were administered the Balanced Inventory of
Desirable Responding (BIDR) [24], the Machiavellanism Scale
(MACH IV) [25] and the Moral and Civic Disengagement [26].
Results
Binomial Analysis (Truth vs. Lie)
The number of lie and truth responses was collected and used as
dependent variable. The percentage of Truth responses in the NR
block for both groups (No-Presence: 70%; Presence: 70%) was
higher than the percentage of Lie responses (binomial test, No-
Presence: Truth/Lie, p,.01; Presence: Truth/Lie, p,.01). Also in
the Reputation-Risk Block the percentage of Truth responses was
higher for both groups (No Presence: 75%; Presence: 73%;
binomial test, No Presence: Truth/Lie, p=.01; Presence: Truth/
Lie, p=.01) (Table 1, first and second row).
Higher percentage of Truth than Lie responses was found for
both groups in Favourable Reality condition (No-Presence 90%,
Presence 95%; binomial test, No-Presence: Truth/Lie, p,.01;
Presence: Truth/Lie, p,.01). By contrast, the percentage of truth
and lie responses did not differ across groups in the Unfavourable
Reality (binomial test, No-Presence: Truth/Lie, p=.12; Presence:
Truth/Lie, p=.12) (Table 1, third and fourth row).
Analysis of Deceptive Responses
A2 6262 analysis of variance (ANOVA) for mixed models
with Group (No-Presence vs. Presence) as a between-subjects
factor and Reality (Favourable vs. Unfavourable) and Reputation
(Reputation Risk vs. No-Reputation Risk) as within-subject
factors was run. ANOVA did not show any significance of
Group F(1,48) =.03, p=.87 nor its interaction with Reputation
F(1,48) =1.22, p=.28, or Reality F(1,48)=2.07, p=.16.
Interestingly, a main effect of Reputation F(1,48) =10.93,
p,.01, g
2=.19 was found revealing that subjects told more lies
Figure 1. Number of lies. Self-gain and altruistic lies (mean 6 standard error) produced by the two subject groups (No-Presence Group, grey bars;
Presence Group, black bars) in the two possible opponent (OP) choice outcomes (favourable/unfavourable) in the two conditions (Reputation Risk/No-
Reputation Risk) are reported. The number of Self-Gain lies is significantly reduced in the Reputation Risk Condition (p=.01).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0019465.g001
Table 1. Percentage of Truth and Lie responses in each condition.
NO-PRESENCE GROUP PRESENCE GROUP
Lie Truth p Lie Truth p
REPUTATION RISK 25% 75% =.01 27% 73% =.01
NO REPUTATION RISK 30% 70% ,.01 30% 70% ,.01
Lie Truth p Lie Truth p
FAVOURABLE REALITY 10% 90% ,.01 5% 95% ,.01
UNFAVOURABLE REALITY 47% 53% =.12 52% 48% =.12
The null hypothesis in the binomial test is the case in which two categories are equally likely to occur. When this test is statistically significant one category is much
likely to occur than the other. Our data show that the truth responses are significantly more likely to occur in all conditions except in Unfavourable Reality i.e. when OPs
won and Ss lost. In this case, lie and truth responses were comparable both in the No-Presence Group (p=.12) and in the Presence Group (p=.12).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0019465.t001
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Reality was significant F(1,48) =100.53, p,.001, g
2=.68. This
effect is accounted for by the fact that subjects lied more in the
Unfavourable Reality than in the Favourable Reality, thus
producing more self-gain lies then altruistic lies. Crucially, a
significant Risk 6Reality interaction was found F (1,48) =7.58,
p=.01, g
2=.14. The Newman-Keuls post-hoc test for multiple
comparisons showed that whereas no difference in the amount of
altruistic lies between the R block and the NR block was found,
subjects produced more self-gain lies in the NR block respect to
the R block (Figure 1).
Personality Measures
Since the tendency to deceive was comparable in the two
experimental groups, correlational analyses between self-gain or
altruistic lies and personality traits were performed in all the
subjects. No significant correlation was found. We sought to
determine whether dispositional personality factors predicted how
much reputation influenced deception. To this aim, we created a
quantitative index of deception by subtracting Altruistic Lies from
the Self-Gain Lies for each block. Then, we computed the impact
of reputation on deception (RoD) as follows:
RoD~ R Self{Gain Lies { R Altruistic Lies ðÞ { ½
NRSelf{Gain Lies { NR Altruistic Lies ðÞ  
Negative and positive scores indicate more lies in the NR and
the R blocks respectively (Figure 2, A).
The seven scales of TCI were entered in a standard multiple
regression model as predictors, with the RoD as dependent
variable. The regression model was significant (R=.52,
adjR2=.15, F (7,42) =2.22, p=.05). ‘‘Reward Dependence’’
(ß= 2.32, t42= 22.03, p=.05) was the independent predictor of
the impact of reputation on deceiving (Figure 2, B). For
regression analyses, we computed the Cohen’s f
2: R2/(1 – R2),
as an index of effect size. Cohen’s f
2 was computed on the
adjusted R2 (f
2=.18).
In addition, we found a significant negative correlation between
RoD and the BIDR Total Score (r=2.28, p=.05) indicating that
the higher the impact of reputation, the more the subjects
responded according to social desirability (Figure 2, C).
Furthermore, RoD correlated positively with MD2 (r=.41,
p,.01) and MACH IV (r=.29, p=.05). Thus, subjects who
showed high scores in moral disengagement (Figure 2, D) and
manipulativeness (Figure 2, E) were less influenced by reputation
risk while being deceptive.
Discussion
We devised a novel experimental paradigm in the form of a
cards game to investigate the effect of situations and dispositions in
promoting deceptive behaviour in an ecological context where
participants decided when to lie to another individual. Important
situational variables were manipulated. Indeed, participants were
faced with the moral dilemma of reverting their loss by lying to an
opponent person who might or might not be in the same room.
Moreover, the subjects’ deceptive behaviour could or could not be
disclosed to others and participants were thus informed that their
Figure 2. Correlations between personality traits and the impact of reputation on deception (RoD). A) the panel shows the RoD index
for each subject. Black dots indicate subjects in whom deceptive behaviour was influenced by reputation risk. White dots indicate subjects in whom
deceptive behaviour was not affected by reputation risk. The left part of the figure shows the negative correlations. B) indicates the TCI reward
dependence scale is an independent predictor of RoD index. C) shows the significant negative correlation between RoD and Social Desirability
Responding [Impression Management + Self-deceptive enhancement (BIDR)]. The right part of the panel show the positive correlations between RoD
and Manipulativeness (MACH IV) (D) and Moral Disengagement (MD 2) (E). The higher impact of reputation (lower RoD), the higher the reward
dependence and social desirable traits; the lower impact (higher RoD), the higher manipulativeness and moral disengagement traits.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0019465.g002
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measures allowed us to assess the participants’ disposition both in
general and towards deception.
At least two key results concerning the situational manipulations
were obtained. First, although participants were overall more
truthful (more than 70% of total responses) than liar (around 30%
of the total responses) and thus tended not to deceive others, a
clear effect of Unfavourable Reality, i.e. of the situation where
participants were more tempted to deceive, was found. In this
latter situation, participants produced an equal number of lie and
truth responses. Thus, the event of loss did increase deceptive
behaviour although not to the point of inducing more lies than
truth responses. That our participants in general did not lie as
default is in keeping with an extensive study reporting that only a
minority of 791 subjects tended to cheat and suggesting that the
range of acceptable dishonesty was limited by the internal reward
of being honest [6]. Importantly, although our paradigm did not
abolish the participants’ tendency to act in a socially appropriate
and sensible manner, it was effective in pushing participants
towards deception.
The second main result is that the reputation risk situation
influenced the production of self-gain but not of altruistic lies.
Studies indicate that altruistic lies, i.e. those produced to provide
someone else’s benefit at one’s own cost, are rated as the most
acceptable and likely to occur. In contrast, the self-gain lies, i.e.
those involving the liar’s benefit at others’ cost, are rated as the
least acceptable [4]. Different circumstances favour the production
of one or the other type of lie. Guilty evoked by positive iniquity
(i.e. when winning a lottery at the cost of others), for example,
make people deceptively help others. In contrast, envy evoked by
negative iniquity (i.e. when loosing a lottery to others’ gain) leads
people to deceptively hurt others [5].
According to the Theory of Self-Concept Maintenance,
producing lies co-exist with the need to regard themselves as
honest individuals [6]. Two main strategies permit to act
dishonestly without affecting the positive concept of self. The first
has to do with the subjects’ tendency to categorize their own
behaviour in a malleable way and thus to reinterpret reality in a
self-serving manner finding a rationalization for dishonest actions.
A clear reduction of deceptive behaviour is obtained by making
very high the monetary gain that can be obtained by cheating.
Indeed, in the above circumstances, the categorization of ones’
own behaviour is less malleable and finding rationalizations for
deception is much harder [6]. The second strategy is the
inattention to one’s own moral standards, implemented so as to
avoid any link between self and dishonest actions [6]. In this vein,
inducing subjects to pay attention to their own moral standards by
asking them to recall the Ten Commandments or to read a code of
honour, decreases the subjects’ tendency to cheat [6].
In our experimental paradigm, subjects were told the interac-
tion was just a game no matter whether reputation was or was not
at risk. Since categorization malleability is comparable in two
conditions, finding rationalizations for being deceptive might have
been equally at play. Also, we reasoned that if reputation enhances
attention to people’s moral standard, deception might be classified
as wrong no matter if produced with the intent to obtain self-gain
or to help others. We found that reputation-risk decreased self-gain
but did not increase altruistic lies. This suggests that, at least in our
experimental conditions, is more important for people to appear
honest than altruistic if this implies deception.
Indirect reciprocity, an important mechanism for the evolution
of cooperation [27], consists in acts where the return for a favour
comes from someone other than the recipient of the benefaction
(i.e. ‘‘I scratch your back and someone else will scratch mine’’).
Helping others even when they cannot directly reciprocate, pays
off anyway. Indeed, studies demonstrate that people who help
another individual are more likely to receive help from others
[16,17]. It is relevant that indirect reciprocity may be linked to
one’s own reputation building [27]. Our subjects knew that the
other player would have not be able to reciprocate directly their
help. However, they could have spread out the voice about their
honesty. Thus, we posit that a kind of indirect reciprocity might
have played a role in the reputation condition of our study.
It is also worth noting that the pattern of deceptive behaviour
was very similar when the opponent was or was not physically in
the participants’ same room during the interactive game. This is
somewhat counterintuitive because the reputation risk should be
higher when the opponent is in the same room. Indeed, reputation
management can be easily induced in subjects even by subtle
observation cues (i.e. pictures of eyes or eye-like stimuli) [28,29]. A
possible explanation for our result is that not allowing participants
to have any physical contact with the other player made the same-
room situation very similar to the online interaction. Therefore, it
is likely that being aware that other people would know about the
subject’s behaviour has been sufficient to induce a strong concern
about the deception-related reputation risk independently of
whether the target of the deceptive behaviour was in the same
or in a different room.
An interesting link between deceptive behaviour and disposi-
tional tendencies was also found in our study. Indeed, the impact
of reputation on self-gain deceptive behaviour turned out to be
associated to a specific personality profile. In particular the
participants who lied less in the reputation-risk situation were also
highly reward dependent, i.e. they were very sensitive to signals of
social approval [30]. Additionally, these subjects showed high
social desirable responding (BIDR) traits, a measure that included
both the intentional tendency of distorting one’s own self by
imaging to be perceived more favourably by others (Impression
Management) and the unintentional tendency to portray oneself in
a positive light (Self-Deception). This result is in line with studies
showing that external cues to self-regulation influence the
expression of prejudice selectively in people with specific
personality traits [20,31]. It has been shown, for example, that
during a stereotype inhibition task performed in a private or in a
public condition (where the experimenter was checking for signs of
prejudice), a larger error-related positive component was elicited
only in subjects who cared about their social image and tried to
appear non-prejudiced [32]. Our data shows that also in the case
of deception, the reputation has an impact only for people highly
concerned about their social image. In addition, we found that the
impact of reputation was less important for high manipulative and
moral disengaged subjects. Manipulative people admit they cheat
to get what they want [25] and moral disengaged people are
particularly able to find moral self-sanction to their misbehaviours
[33]. Taken together, our results have important practical
implications. Indeed, in modern societies often permeated by
deception, people need to understand on what circumstances one
can promote or inhibit this kind of behaviour. We found that when
people face unfavourable situations, the temptation to deceive
becomes stronger. This tendency was not influenced by disposi-
tional variables. Importantly, however, we found a clear link
between personality dimensions and the reputation risk connected
to the public disclosure of the deceptive behaviour. Mere
knowledge of this risk seemed to work as an important restraint
on deception. It must be noticed that in our paradigm subjects did
not risk to be punished for their behaviour. Tellingly, evolutionary
game theory studies [34,35,36] reviewed the role of reward and
punishment in promoting public cooperation and found that
Determinants of Intentional Deceiving
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promote cooperation. This suggests that promoting a policy of
transparency where the entire decision making process is carried
out publicly and where building one’s own reputation works as a
social reward, could be a good deterrent for deception in social
contexts. It is worth noting, however, that not all the people are
affected by reputation. Thus, further investigation is needed to
understand the complex interaction between dispositional and
situational determinants of deception. As a final remark, we want
to emphasize that the novel paradigm used in the present study
turned out to be adept to induce a conflict between the temptation
to deceive and the desire to act in a socially appropriate manner.
Therefore, we propose it as a potentially very useful for testing lie
and deception in ecological contexts at behavioural and neural
levels.
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